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In this chapter we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number of al-
ternative reform scenarios may have on the total expenditure for public
pensions in Spain. We consider ﬁve scenarios: the ﬁrst three are common
to the other countries considered in this volume, while the second two cor-
respond to speciﬁc reforms adopted by the Spanish government in 1997
and 2002.
Each reform scenario consists of changes to one or more of the consti-
tutive elements of a public pension system: retirement age, replacement
rate as a function of the number of contributive years, penalization for
early retirement, and contribution rate. The kind of reforms considered
here, similar to those debated in many advanced countries, would have
been politically unthinkable twenty or thirty years ago, when most of the
current work force began its contributive careers. Hence, the changes con-
sidered, should they be implemented, would certainly take most contribu-
tors oﬀ guard and would engender, for given contributive histories and
wage proﬁles, substantial changes in their net position toward the social se-
curity administration. While workers are likely to react to the change of
rules by modifying their behavior when a reform takes place, it is also clear
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dación Banco Bilboa Vizcaya Argentaria (FBBVA) for ﬁnancial support.at the very beginning of their contributive histories. In other words, re-
forming pension systems will mechanically aﬀect expenditure by changing
the relationship between past work histories, contributions, and expected
beneﬁts in such a way that it cannot be undone by the reaction of the eco-
nomic agents. We call this the mechanical eﬀect, to distinguish it from the
behavioral one. The latter is meant to measure the variation in expenditure
brought about by the changing behavior of the workers facing a diﬀerent
incentive system. Our evaluation aims at providing a separate quantitative
evaluation of these two eﬀects.
To accomplish this, we strive to model the behavioral response of diﬀer-
ent individuals to the changing incentives provided by each reform sce-
nario. We use the results from previous microeconometric studies of Span-
ish retirement patterns (especially Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín and Peracchi
[2004]) to capture the behavioral responses of diﬀerent individuals. Such
behavioral responses have been estimated by means of a family of reduced-
form models of retirement behavior in which various ﬁnancial measures of
the incentive to retirement are used.
In keeping with the tradition of this series, we consider both common
scenarios, which apply equally to each country in the group, and national
scenarios, which are meant to capture hypotheses of reform historically
relevant for the speciﬁc country under examination. In the case of Spain,
we simulate the impact of the 1997 reform (which was fully implemented at
the end of 2002) and of the 2002 amendment to the same reform; from now
on, respectively, the reform and the amendment. See table 9.1 for a sum-
mary description of these measures.
Our quantitative ﬁndings can be summarized in two sentences. For all
the reforms considered, the ﬁnancial impact of the mechanical eﬀect is or-
der of magnitudes larger than the behavioral impact. For the two Spanish
reforms, we ﬁnd once again that their eﬀect on the outstanding liability of
the Spanish social security system is negligible: neither the mechanical
nor the behavioral eﬀect amounts to much for the 1997 reform, and they
amount to very little for the 2002 amendment.
The reason for the ﬁrst ﬁnding is, quite simply, that the underlying be-
havioral model, which is meant to map changes in ﬁnancial incentives into
changes in retirement patterns, explains a very small proportion of the
measured variability in actual retirement behavior and, of that small por-
tion, the part that is captured by the ﬁnancial incentives is just a fraction.
Hence, changing ﬁnancial incentives does not seem to make much of a
diﬀerence (at least according to our sample) to the behavioral model
adopted in these studies and to the estimation we have performed. The rea-
son for the second ﬁnding is that, given the structure of the current Span-
ish labor force and given the contributive histories of its members, the re-
form and the amendment make little diﬀerence: for most individuals, the
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old and the new rules. Further, as the new rules change incentives to re-
tirement only very slightly, we predict that people’s behavior will also only
very slightly change. If the reforms had been introduced to reduce public
pension expenditure, then our conclusion is that they are very ineﬀective
and badly designed. If they had been introduced to pretend something was
being done without doing anything, then they can be declared a success.
9.2 Background of the System
9.2.1 Public Programs for Old-Age Workers
We provide here a brief description of the pre-1997 social security sys-
tem reform. Changes introduced by the reform and the amendment are
noted later. For more details on the Spanish social security system, we re-
fer the reader to Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi (1999, 2001).
Table 9.1 summarizes the programs available after age 50. Leaving aside
private pensions, there are three public programs that aﬀect the behavior
of old age workers: unemployment beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, and retire-
ment pensions.
Unemployment beneﬁts are generally conditional on previous periods
of contributions and are available only for workers in the General Regime
(RGSS) of the Spanish social security (S3) system.1 There are two continu-
ation programs for those who have exhausted their entitlement to contrib-
utory unemployment beneﬁts: one for those aged over 45 (UB45  pro-
gram) and the other for those aged over 52 (UB52 program). The latter is
a special subsidy for unemployed people who are older than 52, lack other
income sources, have contributed to unemployment insurance for at least
six years in their life and, except for age, satisfy all requirements for an old-
age pension.
The S3 system provides insurance against both temporary and perma-
nent illness or disability. Contributory disability (DI) beneﬁts are far more
generous than any other old-age program, since they are not subject to
penalties for young age or insuﬃcient years of contribution.2 Disability in-
surance beneﬁts are subject to approval by a medical examiner (notoriously,
the tightness of admissibility criteria used by examiners varies over time and
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1. People enrolled in any of the special regimes (RESS) either have no access to unemploy-
ment beneﬁts (self-employed and household employees) or have special unemployment pro-
grams (farmers and ﬁshermen).
2. For a discussion of noncontributory disability pensions and other marginal insurance
schemes (which are not relevant to the following analysis and have little or no impact on the
retirement decisions of the workers we are considering) see Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and
Peracchi (1999).across regions) and, since the early 1990s, they have become harder to ob-
tain at older ages. In fact, and contrary to the practice prevailing during the
1980s, it is now uncommon to access permanent DI beneﬁts after age 55.
This has been achieved mainly by tightening the disability evaluation pro-
cess for the temporary illness program (Incapacidad Laboral Transitoria),
which, in the past, was most often used as a bridge to retirement.
Both the unemployment and the disability plans oﬀer, as we will subse-
quently argue, a pathway-to-early-retirement alternative to the oﬃcial one
(the latter consisting of early retirement at 60 and of normal retirement at
65). Such alternative pathways are taken into account in our estimation
and simulation procedures.
The retirement program we label oﬃcial (or regular) oﬀers two options:
early retirement and normal retirement. Early retirement is possible from
age 60, but it only applies to workers who started their contributive career
before 1967. The normal retirement age is 65, although some professional
groups have lower normal retirement ages (e.g., miners, military personnel,
policemen, ﬁshermen). Collective wage settlements often impose manda-
tory retirement at age 65, facilitate retirement at 64 with full beneﬁts, or en-
courage retirement between 60 and 63 through lump-sum payments.
9.2.2 Social Security Regimes and Their Rules
Under current legislation, public contributory pensions are provided by
the following programs.
• The General Social Security Scheme (Régimen General de la Seguridad
Social,or RGSS) and the Special Social Security Schemes (Regímenes
Especiales de la Seguridad Social, or RESS) cover, respectively, the
private-sector employees as well as self-employed workers and profes-
sionals. The RGSS also covers the members of cooperative ﬁrms, the
employees of most public administrations other than the central gov-
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Table 9.1 Public programs at older ages
Unemployment Disability Private Social security
Age insurance insurance pension plan beneﬁtsa
50 Cont. from 45  Cont./Non-cont. Yes b
52 Cont. from 52  Cont./Non-cont. Yes b
55 Cont. from 52  Cont./Non-cont. Yes b
60 Cont. Cont./Non-cont. Yes ER: Cont.
65 Yes NR: Cont./Non-cont.
Notes:Cont.  contributory; Non-cont.  noncontributory; 45 and 52  Special UI pro-
gram for 45  and 52  workers enrolled in the RGSS; ER   early retirement; NR   normal
retirement.
aAll public programs provide beneﬁts for dependants.
bThere are age bonuses for certain professions, allowing for retirement before 60.ernments, and all unemployed individuals who comply with the mini-
mum number of contributory years upon reaching 65. The RESS in-
clude ﬁve special schemes:
1. Self-employed (Régimen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos
[RETA]).
2. Agricultural workers and small farmers (Régimen Especial
Agrario [REA]).
3. Domestic workers (Régimen Especial de Empleados de Hogar
[REEH]).
4. Sailors (Régimen Especial de Trabajadores del Mar [RETM]).
5. Coal miners (Régimen Especial de la Minería del Carbón
[REMC]).
• The scheme for government employees (Régimen de Clases Pasivas
[RCP]) includes public servants employed by the central government
and its local branches. In this study we do not consider this regime.
Legislation approved by the Spanish parliament in 1997 established the
progressive elimination of all the special regimes but RETA by the end of
year 2001. At the moment, however, this piece of legislation has not been
implemented, and the special regimes are still active.
9.2.3 Rules of the RGSS
This subsection describes the rules, since 1985, governing the old-age
and survivors’ pensions in the RGSS. The changes introduced by the 1997
reform (R97) and the 2002 (A02) amendment will be illustrated as we pro-
gress. A summary of the basic technical aspects of the pre- and post-1997
systems can be found in table 9.2.
Financing and Eligibility
The RGSS is a pure pay-as-you-go scheme. Contributions are a ﬁxed
proportion of covered earnings, deﬁned as total earnings, excluding pay-
ments for overtime work, between a ﬂoor and a ceiling that vary by broadly
deﬁned professional categories. Eleven categories are currently distin-
guished, but the eﬀective number of ceilings and ﬂoors for covered earn-
ings is only four.
The current RGSS contribution rate is 28.3 percent, of which 23.6 per-
cent is attributed to the employer and the remaining 4.7 percent to the
employee. A tax rate of 14 percent is levied on earnings from overtime
work.
Entitlement to an old-age pension requires at least ﬁfteen years of con-
tributions. As a general rule, recipiency is conditional on having reached
age 65, and is incompatible with income from any kind of employment re-
quiring aﬃliation with the Social Security system.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When eligibility conditions are met, a retiring worker receives an initial
monthly pension P t equal to
P t    nBRt,
where the beneﬁt base (base reguladora) BRt is a weighted average of cov-
ered monthly earnings over a reference period that consists of the last eight
years before retirement:
BRt    ∑
24
j 1
W t j  ∑
96
j 25
W t j  ,
where W t–j and It–j are earnings and the consumer price index is in the j-th
month before retirement. Pensions are paid in fourteen annual install-
ments, hence the division by 112 in the previous formula.
The replacement rate  n depends on the age of the retirees and on the
number of years of contribution. When age is below 60,  n 0 for all n. For
age equal or larger than 65,  n is equal to
 n   
In the case of early retirement, that is, for ages between 60 and 65,  n is
determined by the previous formula multiplied by a penalization factor.
The latter is equal to .6 at 60, and increases .08 each year until reaching the
value of 1.0 at age 65.
Beginning in 1997, the number of reference years used for computing BRt
has been increased by one every year until 2003, to reach a total of ﬁfteen
years. The formula for computing  n has been changed to the following:
 n   
The penalization factors have, basically, remained the same, an exception
made for workers with forty or more years of contributions (details in the
next subsection).
The A02 amendment allows for the possibility of  n being greater than
one when people are above age 65, that is,
 n   1   .02(a   65), if 65   a and n   35.
if n   15,
if 15   n   25,
if 25   n   35,
if 35   n.
0,
.5   .03 (n   15),
.8   .02 (n   25),
1,
if n   15,
if 15   n   35,
if 35   n.
0,
.6   .02 (n   15),
1,





358 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-MartinIn all of our simulations we use the pre-1997 formula, which was in place
over the relevant sample period. We consider the impact of the 1997 reform
and the 2002 amendment when examining alternative policies (see, respec-
tively, R97 and A02 in section 9.7).
Outstanding pensions are fully indexed to price inﬂation, as measured
by the consumer price index. Until 1986, pensions were also indexed to real
wage growth.
Early Retirement
The normal retirement age is 65, but early retirement at age 60 is per-
mitted as a general rule for those who became aﬃliated with the Social Se-
curity system (Mutualidades Laborales) before 1967. The replacement rate
for early retirees is reduced by 8 percentage points for each year under age
65. Starting from 1997, workers who retire after age 60 with forty or more
contributive years are charged a penalty of only 7 percent for each year un-
der age 65. The 2002 amendment has further modiﬁed the rules determin-
ing the replacement rate. It now reads as follows:
 n   
where
   
Unless a collective labor agreement prescribes mandatory retirement,
individuals may continue working after age 65. Before 2002, there were no
incentives to work past age 65. As mentioned, the 2002 legislation now al-
lows for
 n   1   .02(a   65), if 65   a and n   35,
and eliminates social security contributions for workers meeting the eligi-
bility criteria for full normal retirement (a   65 and n   35) who continue
working.
About 10 percent of the workers enrolled in the RGSS are actually ex-
empt from reduction in the replacement rate in case of early retirement.
This applies to a number of privileged categories (bullﬁghters, employees of
railroads, airlines, and public transportation, for example), or to workers
if n   30,
if 31   n   34,
if 35   n   37,
if 38   n   39,






if a   61,
if 61   a   65,
if 65   a,
0,
1    (65   a),
1,
Spanish Pension Expenditure under Alternative Reform Scenarios 359who were laid oﬀ during cases of industrial restructuring regulated by spe-
cial legislation. These exemption rights are portable in proportion to the
number of years spent working in the privileged sector.
Maximum and Minimum Pension
Pensions are subject to a ceiling, legislated annually and roughly equal
to the ceiling on covered earnings. The 2000 ceiling corresponds to about
4.3 times the minimum wage (salario mínimo interprofesional [SMI]) and
about 1.6 times the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing and
service sectors. If the initial old-age pension, as previously computed, is be-
low a minimum, then the minimum pension is paid. The latter is also legis-
lated annually. Other things being equal, minimum pensions are higher for
those who are older than 65 or who have a dependent spouse.
In the last decade, minimum pensions grew at about the same rate as
nominal wages, whereas maximum pensions grew at the rate of inﬂation.
The ratio between the minimum old-age pension and the minimum wage
has been increasing steadily from the late 1970s (it was 75 percent in 1975)
until reaching almost 100 percent in the early 1990s. The percentage of
RGSS retirees receiving a minimum pension has been declining steadily,
from over 75 percent in the late 1970s to 27 percent in 1995.
Family Considerations
A pensioner receives a ﬁxed annual allowance for each dependent child
who is younger than 18 or is disabled. In 2000, this allowance was equal to
48,420 pesetas for each child under 18, and to 468,720 pesetas (45 percent
of the annualized minimum wage) for each disabled child.
Survivors (spouse, children, other relatives) may receive a fraction of the
beneﬁt base of the deceased if the latter was a pensioner or died before re-
tirement after contributing for at least 500 days in the last ﬁve years. The
beneﬁt base is computed diﬀerently in the two cases. If the deceased was a
pensioner, the beneﬁt base coincides with the pension. If the deceased was
working, it is computed as an average of covered earnings over an uninter-
rupted period of two years, chosen by the beneﬁciary, among the last seven
years immediately before death. If death occurred because of a work acci-
dent or a professional illness, then the beneﬁt base coincides with the last
earnings.
The surviving spouse gets 45 percent of the beneﬁt base of the deceased
(46 percent after the 2002 amendment, a fraction that will be further in-
creased in forthcoming years). In case of divorce, the pension is divided be-
tween the various spouses according to the length of their marriage with
the deceased. Such a pension is compatible with labor income and any
other old-age or disability pension, but is lost if the spouse remarries.
Each of the surviving children gets 20 percent of the beneﬁt base until
the age of 18 (raised to 23 percent in 1997). An orphan who is the sole ben-
360 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-Martineﬁciary may receive up to 65 percent of the beneﬁt base. If there are several
surviving children, the sum of the pensions to the surviving spouse (if any)
and the children cannot exceed 100 percent of the beneﬁt base.
A Spanish peculiarity is the pension in favor of family members. This
pension entitles other surviving relatives (e.g., parents, grandparents, sib-
lings, nephews) to 20 percent of the beneﬁt base of the principal if they sat-
isfy certain eligibility conditions (older than 45, do not have a spouse, do
not have other means of subsistence, have been living with and depending
economically upon the deceased for the last two years). To this pension,
one may add the 45 percent survivors’ pension if there is no surviving
spouse or eligible surviving children.
9.2.4 Special Schemes
In this section we sketch the main diﬀerences between the general and
the special schemes. Whereas rules and regulations for sailors and coal min-
ers are very similar to the ones for the general scheme, special rules apply
to the self-employed, farmers, agricultural workers, domestic helpers, and
a few other categories not discussed here, such as part-time workers, art-
ists, travelling salespeople, and bullﬁghters. Beside the diﬀerences in the SS
tax rate and the deﬁnition of covered earnings, an important diﬀerence is
the fact that aﬃliates of the special schemes have no early-retirement op-
tion (exceptions are made for miners and sailors).
The rest of this section focuses on the special schemes for self-employed
workers (RETA) and farmers (REA), which together represent 93 percent
of the aﬃliates of the special schemes, and 86 percent of the pensions they
pay out.
Self-employed
While the SS tax rate is the same for the RETA and the general scheme
(28.3 percent in 2000), covered earnings are computed diﬀerently, as the
self-employed are essentially free to choose their covered earnings between
a ﬂoor and a ceiling that are legislated annually. Not surprisingly, in light
of the strong progressivity of Spanish personal income taxes, a suspi-
ciously large proportion of self-employed workers report earnings equal to
the legislated ﬂoor until they reach age 50. After that age one observes a
sudden increase in reported covered earnings. This behavior exploits the ﬁ-
nite memory in the formula for the calculation of the initial pension.
In 2000, the RETA contributive ﬂoor and ceiling were equal to 116,160
pesetas (pta) and 407,790 pta per month respectively, corresponding to 1.4
and 5 times the minimum wage, and to .5 and 1.9 times the average earn-
ings in manufacturing and services. To reduce misreporting of earnings on
the part of the self-employed, a diﬀerent ceiling applies to self-employed
aged over 50 who had not reported higher earnings in previous years. In
Spanish Pension Expenditure under Alternative Reform Scenarios 3612000, the latter was only 219,000 pta per month, roughly equal to average
monthly earnings.
A crucial diﬀerence with respect to the general scheme is that, under the
RETA, recipiency of an old-age pension is compatible with maintaining
the self-employed status. The implications of this provision for the retire-
ment behavior of self-employed workers are discussed later.
Other important provisions are the following: RETA only requires ﬁve
years of contributions in the ten years immediately before the death of the
principal in order to qualify for survivors’ pensions. Under RETA, the lat-
ter is 50 percent of the beneﬁt base. If the principal was not a pensioner at
the time of death, the beneﬁt base is computed as the average of covered
earnings over an uninterrupted period of ﬁve years, chosen by the beneﬁ-
ciary among the last ten years before the death of the principal.
Farmers
In this case, both the SS tax rate and the covered earnings diﬀer with re-
spect to the general scheme. Self-employed farmers pay 19.75 percent of a
tax base that is legislated annually and is only weakly related to average
earnings. In 2000, this was equal to 91,740 pta per month, corresponding
to 1.24 times the minimum wage and about 40 percent of average monthly
earnings in the manufacturing and service sectors.
Farm employees, instead, pay 11.5 percent of a monthly base that de-
pends on their professional category and is also legislated annually. In ad-
dition, for each day of work, their employer must pay 15.5 percent of a
daily base that also varies by professional category and is legislated annu-
ally.
9.3 Key Ingredients of the Retirement Models
In this section we review the main steps taken in order to estimate
reduced-form retirement models. First, we describe the sample and the char-
acteristics of the earning processes. Then we construct the various mea-
sures of social security incentives. In the last part we review the results from
the estimated models.
9.3.1 The Sample
Our main microeconomic dataset is based on administrative records
from the Spanish Social Security Administration (Historiales Laborales de
la Seguridad Social [HLSS]). The sample consists of 250,000 individual
work histories randomly drawn from the historical ﬁles of SS aﬃliates
(Fichero Histórico de Aﬁliados [FHA]). The sample includes only individ-
uals aged over 40 on July 31, 1998, the date at which the ﬁles were prepared.
The sample contains individuals from the RGSS and the ﬁve special re-
gimes—RETA, REA, REEH, RTMC, and RTMAR. As we mentioned
362 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-Martinearlier, civil servants and other central government employees are not cov-
ered by the SS administration and are not considered in this study.
The dataset consists of three ﬁles. The ﬁrst ﬁle (the history ﬁle, or H) con-
tains the work history of individuals in the sample. Each record in this ﬁle
describes a single employment period of the individual. As we argue later,
the work histories are very accurate for periods or histories that began af-
ter the mid-1960s. The second ﬁle (covered earnings ﬁle, or CE) contains
annual averages of covered earnings (bases de cotización) from 1986 to
1995. The third ﬁle (beneﬁts ﬁle, or B) contains information on the lifetime
SS beneﬁts received by individuals in the sample. Beneﬁts are classiﬁed by
function (retirement, disability, survival, etc.) and initial amount received.
To be more precise, the beneﬁts ﬁle contains the initial beneﬁt amount and
the length of the period during which the beneﬁt was received. A fourth ﬁle
(relatives ﬁle, or R) is also available; it reports some beneﬁts paid to rela-
tives of the individual while members of his or her household.
For each individual in the sample who contributed to SS during the
1986–1995 period, the CE ﬁle reports the annual average of covered earn-
ings together with the contributions paid. For individuals enrolled in either
the RGSS or the RTMC, covered earnings are a doubly censored (from
above and below) version of real earnings. This is due to the existence of
legislated ceilings and ﬂoors, as reported earlier. For people enrolled in SS
regimes other than RGSS and RTMC, covered earnings are chosen by the
individual within given ceilings and ﬂoors (see section 9.2 for details) and,
consequently, in this case there is no clear link between covered and actual
earnings.
For each employment spell in the HLSS-H ﬁle, we know age, sex, and
marital status of the person, the duration of the period (in days), the
type of contract (in particular, we can distinguish between part-time and
full-time contracts), the social security regime, the contributive group, the
cause for the termination of the period, the sector of employment (4-digits
SIC), and the region of residence (52 Spanish provinces). For each indi-
vidual in the H ﬁle who has received some beneﬁts at any point, we know
most of the information that the SS Administration uses to compute the
monthly beneﬁts to be paid. In particular, we know the initial and current
pension, the beneﬁt base (base reguladora), the number of contributive
years, the current integration toward the minimum pension (complementos
por el mínimo), the date pension was claimed, the date it was awarded, the
type of beneﬁts, and so on. See Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi
(2004) for a description of the demographic characteristics of the sample
and the sample selection rules.
9.3.2 Earnings Distribution, Earnings Histories, and Projections
As commented in section 9.3.1, we do not observe earnings directly but
only covered earnings. Covered earnings are a doubly censored version of
Spanish Pension Expenditure under Alternative Reform Scenarios 363earnings for workers in the RGSS or Regimen Trabajadores Mineria Car-
bon (RTMC), while they are very weakly related to true earnings for work-
ers in the RETA because of the presence of both legislated tariﬀs and wide-
spread tax fraud.
RGSS and RTMC
To deal with the top-censoring problem, we proceed as follows. First, we
estimate a Tobit model for covered earnings. Then we use the estimated pa-
rameters to impute the earnings of the censored observations and to esti-
mate an earning function using imputed earnings for those aﬀected by the
ceilings. Finally, we generate true earnings for all the individuals in the top
censored groups, by using the estimated regression function and adding an
individual, random noise component.
From the individual proﬁle of covered earnings ctbetween year T– kand
year T we impute the individual proﬁle of true real earnings (wt, t   T – k,
...  ,  T). Given this information, we project earnings forward and back-
ward in the following way.
• Forward: here we assume zero real growth, hence w ˆ T m   wT for m  
1, . . . , M.
• Backward: w ˆ T–k–1   wT–k   g(aT–k–1) for l   1, . . . , L. The function g( )
corrects for the growth of log earnings imputable to age a and is de-
ﬁned as:
g(aT k l)    1   aT k l    2   a2
T k l    1   aT k    2   a2
T k.
The  s are the estimated coeﬃcients from a ﬁxed-eﬀects earnings
equation, the details of which are available upon request. The correc-
tion is speciﬁc for each combination of sex and contributive group.
We further correct backward the log of average earnings to control for
the variation of the average productivity of the Spanish economy in the pe-
riod 1960–1985, which is the time horizon of our backward projection.
RETA
As already pointed out, for individuals enrolled in the RETA, covered
earnings are very weakly related to true earnings. The self-employed are
free to choose their beneﬁt base between an annual ﬂoor and ceiling, and
practically all choose the ﬂoor. This implies that there is no way in which
true earnings for the self-employed can be recovered from the HLSS
dataset. We are therefore forced to assume that the earnings and the con-
tributive proﬁle coincide. Thus, we project (real) earnings given the ob-
served proﬁle of (real) contributions as follows:
• Backward: wt–k–l   ct–k, for l   1, . . . , L,
• Forward: wt m   ct(1   g)m, for m   1, . . . , M with g   0.005.
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ﬁrst time they are observed, while they grow at a constant annual rate of 0.5
percent thereafter.
It is important to recall, from section 9.2, that current Spanish legisla-
tion allows the self-employed to begin drawing retirement pensions with-
out retiring, at least as long as they keep managing their own business.
Hence, in the dynamic choice of the self-employed, the opportunity cost of
retiring is not measured by the loss of future earnings but, instead, by the
fact that contributions can no longer be accumulated to increase future
pensions, and marginal income taxes must be paid on pensions. This im-
plies that for the self-employed, maximization of the (net of taxes) Social
Security payoﬀ is a very reasonable, objective function.
9.3.3 Evaluation of Social Security Incentives
Assumptions
For every male worker in the wage sample who is enrolled either in the
RGSS or in the RETA we assume that: (a) he is married to a nonworking
spouse, (b) his wife is three years younger, and (c) his mortality corre-
sponds to the baseline male mortality from the most recent available life
tables (INE 1995).
For every female in the wage sample we assume that: (a) she is married
to either a retiree or a worker entitled to retirement beneﬁts, (b) her hus-
band is four years older, and (c) her mortality is the baseline female mor-
tality from the most recent available life tables (INE 1995).
For both men and women we further assume that (d) starting at age 55
and until age 65, there are three pathways to retirement: the UB52  pro-
gram, DI beneﬁts, and early retirement. At each age, an individual has an
age-speciﬁc probability of entering retirement using any of these three pro-
grams. However, the following restrictions are important in characterizing
the actual usage of the three pathways to retirement.
1. No person has access to early retirement before age 60.
2. After age 60, a person cannot claim UB52  and can only claim early
retirement or DI beneﬁts.
3. A self-employed person enrolled in RETA can never claim UB52 
beneﬁts.
This implies that, in practice, pathways for retirement are relatively
simple. For people in the RGSS, either they retire before 60 via the UB52 
or the DI beneﬁts program or they retire after 60 via the DI (most unlikely,
though, since 1992) or the retirement program. People in the RESS either
go via the DI beneﬁts or the retirement program, with the likelihood of the
former being low and decreasing from age 60 onward.
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For a worker of age a, we deﬁne social security wealth (SSW) in case of
retirement at age h aas the expected present value of future pension ben-
eﬁts.




Here Sis the age of certain death,  s   s–a s, with  denoting the pure time
discount factor and  s the conditional survival probability at age s for an
individual alive at age a, and Bs(h) the pension expected at age s   h   1 in
case of retirement at age h. Given SSW, we deﬁne three incentive variables
for a worker of age a:
1. Social security accrual (SSA) is the diﬀerence in SSW from postpon-
ing retirement from age a to age a   1
SSAa   SSW a 1   SSW a   ∑
S
s a 2
 s[Bs(a   1)   Bs(a)]    a 1Ba 1(a).
The SSA is positive if the expected present value ΣS
s a 2  s[Bs(a   1) – Bs(a)]
of the increment in the ﬂow of pension beneﬁts is greater than the expected
present value  a 1Ba 1(a) of the pension beneﬁt forgone by postponing re-
tirement. If the increments Bs(a   1) – Bs(a) are small, as it is usually the
case, then the SSA is negative. The rescaled negative accrual  a   –SSAa/
W a 1, where W a 1equals expected net earnings at age a 1 based on the in-
formation available up to age a, is called the implicit tax/subsidy on post-
poning retirement from age a to age a   1.
2. Peak value PV a   maxh(SSW h – SSW a), h   a   1, . . . , R, where R is
a mandatory retirement age (which does not exist in Spain, but given the
retirement evidence we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume R   70). Thus, the
peak value is the maximum diﬀerence in SSW between retiring at any fu-
ture age and retiring at age a.
3. Option value OVa   maxh(V h – V a), h   a   1, . . . , R, where




is the total expected utility of retiring at age a, and








is the total expected utility of retiring at age h   a. Thus, the option value
is the maximum utility diﬀerence between retiring at any future age and re-
tiring at age a. We parameterize the model by assuming   .97,   1, and
k   1.25. Under our assumptions, V a   1.25 SSW a and
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h
s a 1
 sW s   1.25 SSW h.
If expected earnings are constant at W a (as assumed by our earnings
model), then
V h   V a   W a ∑
h
s a 1
 s   1.25(SSW h   SSW a),
that is, the peak value and the option value are proportional to each other
except for the eﬀect due to the term Σh
s a 1 s.
The restrictions embodied in assumption (d) require us to combine the
incentive measures Ijfrom the various programs (j UB, DI, R, where UB
denotes unemployment beneﬁts, DI disability beneﬁts, and R the retire-
ment programs) as follows:
I   
where pa
DI denotes the probability of observing a transition from employ-
ment into disability at age a. Since the self-employed have no access to
UB52  beneﬁts, the combined incentives from age 55 to age 59 for mem-
bers of this group change to
I   pa
DIIDI   IR(1   pa
DI), 55   a   59.
We have followed a regression-based approach to compute the uncondi-
tional probability of qualifying for a disability pension (see table 9.3; see
also Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi [2004] for a description).
9.3.4 The Reduced-Form Retirement Model
This section brieﬂy illustrates the explanatory power of our incentive
measures (accrual, peak value, and option value) for retirement behavior.
The results reported here are distilled from the extensive econometric anal-
ysis conducted in Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi (2004), to which
the reader is referred for all relevant details.
We follow a regression-based approach to model the eﬀect of social se-
curity wealth, incentive measure (either accrual, peak, or option value),
and individual demographic characteristics on the decision to retire in
1995, conditional on being active at the end of 1994. Retirement probabili-
ties are assumed to have the probit form
Pr(Ri   1)    ( 1SSW i    2Ii      3Xi),
where R is a binary indicator of retirement,   is the distribution function
of a standard normal, I denotes the incentive measure, and X is a vector of
if 55   a   60,
if 60   a   65,
if 65   a,
pa
DIIDI   IUB(1   pa
DI),
pa
DIIDI   IR(1   pa
DI),
IR,



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.predictors that include individual earnings and sociodemographic charac-
teristics. The socioeconomic and earnings information is richer for the
RGSS than for the RETA. This, coupled with the widespread misreporting
of earnings that characterizes the aﬃliates to RETA, makes a quantitative
analysis of their retirement patterns a very diﬃcult task. Regression results
for RETA, in fact, are much poorer than those for RGSS and, in any case,
should be taken with caution.
For each one of the three incentive measures (accrual, peak, and option
value) we have used the following speciﬁcation for the set of predictors X.
The latter contains an eligibility dummy for attainment of a minimum
of ﬁfteen years of contributions; three industry-speciﬁc variables: the
fraction of collective wage settlements having a clause favoring early re-
tirement, the presence of rules permitting retirement at age 64 without
penalty, and the existence of mandatory retirement at age 65; diﬀerent
measures of seniority on the job and in the labor market (length of the
current employment spell and its square, number of years of contribution
and its square, number of years since ﬁrst employment); dummies for
schooling level and contributive group (only for people in the RGSS); dum-
mies for part-time work and sector of occupation (only for people in the
RGSS); the expected wage and our estimate of the lifetime earnings net
present value and their squares; the net present value of expected wages un-
til the year in which either the peak value or the option value reach their
maximum.
A Summary of Estimation Results
The results obtained for each incentive measure are presented separately
by sex and social security regime in table 9.3. In each case, we have consid-
ered two speciﬁcations for the age eﬀect: a linear time trend (M1) and age-
speciﬁc dummies (M2). The models have been ﬁt to the observed transi-
tions between 1994 and 1995. We show, for each combination of sex and
regime, the estimates of the probit coeﬃcients, their estimated standard er-
rors, and the implied probability eﬀect. Since we report the results from a
large number of models, we concentrate on the variables of interest. The
complete set of results is available from the authors upon request.
Quite obviously, M2 provides a uniformly better ﬁt than M1 and, in par-
ticular, captures the hazard peaks at 60 and 65, which M1 fails to ﬁt; on any
other aspect, though, the qualitative as well as most of the quantitative per-
formances of the two models are equivalent. Hence, the comments that fol-
low apply, unless stated otherwise, to both speciﬁcations. The SSW term is
positive and signiﬁcant in all cases. Contradictory results are obtained in-
stead for the three incentive variables. In fact, while the accrual usually
shows the expected (negative) sign, both the peak and the option value
show the wrong (positive) sign. Further, neither SSW nor the incentive
variables are signiﬁcant for people enrolled in RETA, indicating that the
370 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-MartinSSW and the ﬁnancial variables do not capture retirement incentives for
individuals enrolled in RETA. Measures of ﬁtness, such as the R2, are ei-
ther mediocre or poor, suggesting that a great deal of retirement variabil-
ity cannot be captured by our incentive indicators. This is particularly true
for people enrolled in the special regimes (RETA). These relatively poor re-
sults are discussed at length in Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi
(2004) and we will not go back to them here. They do suggest, though, that
the quantitative impact that a change in the ﬁnancial incentives may have
on predicted retirement behavior is bound to be either negligible or small.
The implied probability eﬀects are minuscule, suggesting that only abnor-
mally large variations in the incentive measures may be able to have a quan-
titatively sizable eﬀect on early retirement. As a consequence of this fact,
when evaluating the policy reforms we concentrate our attention mostly on
changes in SSW and on the eﬀect of variables other than the pure ﬁnancial
incentive variables. As the forthcoming analysis underlines, reforming the
legislated early and normal retirement age appears to be the most reliable
and eﬀective way of altering existing retirement patterns.
9.4 Simulation Methodology
9.4.1 Policy Simulations
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the budgetary implications
of pension system reforms. In the simulations we consider ﬁve policies, of
which the last two are speciﬁc to the Spanish case:
R1: Three-Year Reform. A reform of the existing system, consisting of a
three-year increase in both the early and the normal retirement age
(ERA and NRA, respectively), while keeping all other aspects of the
Spanish social security system unchanged.
R2: Actuarial Reform. This reform introduces the following change to the
base Spanish pension system: a 6 percent annual actuarial adjustment
per year away from the normal retirement age. Beneﬁts become available
at the existing ERA (60), and retirements after the NRA receive a posi-
tive 6 percent adjustment per year. This actuarial adjustment is also
applied to disability beneﬁts.
R3: Common Reform. This reform implies the following changes to the
base system: (a) ERA at 60, (b) NRA at 65, (c) a replacement rate at age
65 equal to 60 percent of the gross (but net of the employers contribu-
tions) average lifetime earnings (on the best 40 earnings years before re-
tirement or the ﬁrst age of eligibility, whichever comes ﬁrst), and an ac-
tuarial adjustment of 3.6 percent per year from age 60 to 70 (this implies
a replacement rate of 42 percent at age 60 and 78 percent at age 70). No-
tice that (a) and (b) correspond to the current Spanish system, whereas
Spanish Pension Expenditure under Alternative Reform Scenarios 371the actuarial adjustment for retirement before age 65 is less favorable
than the one currently used in Spain. Also, the current Spanish system is
more generous for retirement at age 65 and has no actuarial adjustment
for postponing retirement after that age.
R97: The retirement regime created by the 1997 Spanish reform.
A02: The previous regime, as altered by the amendment introduced in
2002.
We recall that the 1997 reform, described in section 9.2, implies the fol-
lowing changes in the basic beneﬁt formula and in the penalties related to
age and contributive history: (a) the number of years of contribution used
to construct the beneﬁt base is increased from eight, as prescribed by the
1985 legislation, to ﬁfteen, (b) workers retiring after the age of 60 with 40
or more contributive years are charged an actuarial adjustment of only 7
percent (instead of 8 percent) for each year under age 65, and (c) the
penalty for insuﬃcient contributions is such that the replacement rate (ra-
tio between pension and BR) is
 n   
The 2002 amendment has introduced the following changes, which are
also illustrated in section 9.2: (a) a generalized penalization rule for early
retirement, starting at age 61; (b) a new incentive scheme for those retiring
after the age 65 with at least 35 years of contributions; (c) an increase in
survivor beneﬁts.
For each of the ﬁve policies we carry out the following simulations:
S1: Starting from the model with a linear trend (M1), we modify the SSW
and incentive measures in accordance with the new policy. Speciﬁcally,
in the calculation of SSW, we increase by three years the early and the
normal retirement ages and shift by three years the age-speciﬁc proba-
bility of receiving DI-UI beneﬁts.
S2: Starting this time from M2, we modify the SSW and incentive measures
according to the assumed policy changes. We also change the probabili-
ties of receiving DI beneﬁts, by setting them to zero after age 60, but
leave untouched the coeﬃcients on the age dummies.
S3: Again using M2, in addition to the changes described in S2, we also
shift the coeﬃcients on the age dummies by three years, so that the en-
tire age proﬁle of the retirement hazard shifts forward by three years.
Speciﬁcally, in the calculation of SSW, we increase by three years the
early and the normal retirement ages, and shift by three years the age-
speciﬁc probability of receiving DI-UI beneﬁts.
if n   15,
if 15   n   25,
if 25   n   35,
if 35   n.
0,
.5   .03(n   15),
.8   .02(n   25),
1,
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We use individuals born in 1940 (aged 55 in 1995) extracted from the
sample described previously, since the zero real-growth assumption seems
to be very unrealistic for younger cohorts. We have concentrated on work-
ers enrolled in either the general regime (RGSS) or the self-employed re-
gime (RETA). These two groups cover practically 90 percent of the aﬃli-
ates to the Spanish social security.
Given that the base sample (HLSS) is not completely representative of
the regional distribution of Spanish employment, we have constructed a
balanced random sample by sampling (with replacement) from the HLSS,
using the population weights of the six territorial areas into which Spain is
divided by the Labor Force Survey (EPA). The rebalancing procedure has
been further reﬁned by taking into account, within each of the six regions,
the composition of the labor force by sex and by contributive regime. In a
second step, weights have been assigned to each observation in order to
replicate the population number of workers born in 1940 who were active
in the labor market in 1995 (farmers and civil servants excluded).
9.4.3 Baseline Case and Family Assumptions
Our baseline case makes the same assumptions as in Boldrin, Jiménez-
Martín, and Peracchi (2004) with regard to interest and mortality rates.
The other assumptions are illustrated next.
Marital Status Assumptions
We have used family data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey to obtain
information on the marital status of individuals born in 1940. The main
ﬁndings, which we try to replicate in our simulations, are the following:
• Male: 95 percent married and 5 percent single. Among those married,
75.2 percent have a nonworking spouse and the rest a working spouse.
In both cases the spouse was (on average), born in 1943 (aged 52).
• Female: 74 percent married and 26 percent single. Among those mar-
ried, 34.5 have a nonworking spouse (presumably retired) and the rest
a working spouse. In both cases the spouse (on average) was born in
1937 (aged 58).
Two remarks are relevant with respect to the way in which the beneﬁts of
survivorship are handled in the simulation exercises.
1. Since survivor and retirement beneﬁts are fully compatible (up to
the amount of the maximum pension) there is no necessity to correct for
double counting in the Spanish case. Whenever the maximum pension ceil-
ing is supposed to take eﬀect, this is applied to the total pension payments
accruing to the survivor.
2. Survivor beneﬁts accruing to members of the 1940 cohort in force of
Spanish Pension Expenditure under Alternative Reform Scenarios 373their having a working spouse are not accounted for (i.e., are not included in
the computation of the SSW for a member of the 1940 cohort) since they are
included in the computation of beneﬁts for the cohort the spouse belongs to.
Dependant Assumptions
As noted previously, our dataset does not provide suﬃcient information
on marital status or on the number and age of dependants. In our projec-
tions, we handle this inconvenience by using information extracted from
the Spanish Labor Survey over the 1995–2001 period. From such data we
compute the average number of dependants (per worker) in each of the six
regions (Catalonia, South, Centre or Castilla, Madrid, East, and North).
We also distinguish by the sex and age of the individual worker. In other
words, we assume that the factors determining the number of dependants
are age, sex, and region of residence. Then we regress the data so collected
for each of the seven years comprised by the EPA sample, and for each re-
gion of residence and sex cell with respect to the age of the worker and its
square. Next, we use these regressions to predict, for people born in 1940,
the average number of dependants when they reach the age between 55 and
70. After that age we assume that the number of dependants (spouse ex-
cluded) drops to zero. In order to impute the beneﬁts for dependants in the
calculation of the SSW, we assume that all of them receive the legislated
minimum (see Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi [2004] for data and
legislation).
9.4.4 Computing Expected Expenditure for Those Who Retire
before Fifty-ﬁve
The goal here is to estimate the total expenditure for pension payments
to those members of the 1940 cohort who retired before the year 1995 (i.e.,
before reaching the age of 55) and whose retirement behavior we will not
try to model. While during the 1980s and early 1990s the number of Span-
ish workers retiring before age 55 was considerable, this practice has been
dropping remarkably quickly during the last decade. As we have already
pointed out, this is due to a substantial tightening of the requirements for
accessing DI beneﬁts and the sharp reduction in the usage of subsidized
early retirement as an instrument for handling industrial restructuring.
The relevant information in our sample has the following form. We have
information on the initial beneﬁts for all the workers belonging to the 1940
cohort who retired before 1998 (age 58). This allows us to reconstruct the
SSW of those workers in pesetas of the reference year (1995 in our case).
To proceed further we need three additional assumptions.
1. Anyone retiring before age 55 did it through the DI program.
2. None of the ﬁve reforms being considered will aﬀect the beneﬁts of
those workers who retire before age 55 by means of the DI program.
374 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-Martin3. The marital status and the number of dependant entitled to beneﬁts
for people in this group are the same as for the average member of the co-
hort.
This allows us to estimate the (after-income taxes) net present value, in
millions of 2001 euros, of the SSW attributable to members of the 1940 co-
hort who retired before the age of 55. This is euro 1,360.4 and 289.6, for
male and females, respectively. These values are to be added to those ob-
tained in tables 9.9 and 9.10.
9.4.5 Computing Expected Expenditure
Our aim is to compute the lifetime net present value (NPV) of the pen-
sion expenditure for a given cohort Caged ain year t. We are endowed with
a sample of N observations from which we want to project expenditure for
a working population of size M. There are two ways of leaving the labor
force: retirement and death. Under such circumstances, the expected net
present value of the beneﬁts payments for person i of cohort C is given by:
NPVBP i  ∑
S
h a
[ hi(R; X) SSW hi    hi(d; X)SSW d
hi]; i   1, . . . , N,
where  hi(R; X) and  hi(d; X) are, respectively, the conditional probabili-
ties (at age a) of retirement and death at age h. Both of them may depend—
or not—on individual characteristics (X). In our exercise, the retirement
probabilities do depend on individual characteristics and the probability of
dying does not (except for the sex of the individual). Obviously, the retire-
ment probabilities at each age depend on individual characteristics in ac-
cordance with the retirement probabilities estimated previously.
Selecting the adequate weights (which depend on individual character-
istics) for each observation and summing up over individuals we obtain the
projected beneﬁts payments for a given cohort C:
NPVBP C  ∑
N
i 1
NPVPEi   W i(X); i   1, . . . , N,
where W i(X) is the share of individuals of type i in the population, accord-
ing to the vector of characteristics X.
The net present value of social security contributions is given
NPVTP C  ∑
N
i 1
NPVTP i   W i(X); i   1, . . . , N,
where the net present value of social security contributions for an individ-
ual of type i in cohort C has been computed as
NPVTP i  ∑
S
h a
[1    hi(R; X)    hi(d; X)]Cd
hi,
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hi are the social security contributions paid at age h by an individual
of type i. Finally, the projected expenditure (beneﬁts–taxes) is given by
NPVPEC   NPVBP C   NPVTP C.
9.4.6 Elevation to the Population
As noted previously (see Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi [2004]),
the HLSS data source is not completely representative of the Spanish pop-
ulation. In table 9.4 we present the set of population factors we have used
in order to make our sample representative of the working population un-
der study. The source of the weights is the second-quarter wave of the 1995
Spanish Labor Force Survey. We distinguish individuals according to two
social security regimes (RGSS, RETA), six regions (Catalonia, South,
Centre or Castilla, Madrid, East, and North) and by their sex, for a total
of 24 diﬀerent types.
9.4.7 Income Tax and Indirect Taxes
A full evaluation of the ﬁscal impact of a social security reform cannot
be restricted to the impact that the latter may have on the budget of the So-
cial Security Administration alone. While in many countries, Spain being
one of them, the social security administration formally runs a separate
budget distinct from that of the central government, such separation is
only formal and is continuously violated in practical circumstances. So, for
example, in the Spanish system, the employees of the central government
belong to a pension system that is managed directly by the Spanish treas-
ury and is ﬁnanced by general taxation. While the RGSS has been running
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Table 9.4 Population factors for the 1940 cohort in 1995
Male Female
Work force Fraction Work force Fraction
RGSS
Catalonia 2,427,278 .1920417 862,297 .1806272
South 2,655,976 .2101359 1,299,916 .2722962
Castilla 888,563 .0703015 476,717 .0998589
Madrid 2,441,918 .1932 71,427 .1496197
East 2,063,698 .163276 813,333 .1703706
North 2,161,893 .171045 607,372 .1272275
RETA
Catalonia 623,986 .1615313 85,814 .0700625
South 989,671 .2561962 312,326 .2549975
Castilla 308,444 .0798469 148,902 .1215705
Madrid 497,341 .1287467 242,192 .1977368
East 767,909 .1987886 249,680 .2038504
North 675,591 .1748903 185,906 .1517823a current account surplus during the last few years, this was not the case in
the past and, most likely, will not be the case again in the near future. In
previous years, the annual deﬁcits of the RGSS (and of the various regimes
listed in the RESS) were covered by transfers from the central government.
In fact, part of the current surplus of the RGSS is due to the fact that, pro-
gressively, since the 1985 reform, a number of functions originally pertain-
ing to the RGSS have been transferred or are being ﬁnanced directly by
general taxation (Social Security social services [INSERSO], noncontrib-
utive pensions, part of the minimum pension payments, some disability
payments, etc.). More generally, it is quite obvious that surpluses and
deﬁcits of the public pension system are surpluses and deﬁcits of the cen-
tral government, which guarantees the payment of future pensions via its
power of taxation, and which considers the net present value of current and
future pension entitlements as part of the public debt. This implies that a
full picture of the ﬁscal eﬀect of a reform can be achieved only by adding
to the net present value calculations we just illustrated—the impact of
changing work and retirement patterns on other sources of ﬁscal revenues.
Among the latter, income taxes take the lion’s share. By retiring, an in-
dividual not only stops contributing to the pension system and starts draw-
ing a pension; he or she also starts paying income taxes on a pension that
is usually substantially smaller than the previous labor income. This eﬀect
is further magniﬁed by the existence, in many countries, of a strongly pro-
gressive income taxation and a number of exemptions for low incomes,
among which pensions loom large, at least in the case of Spain. Finally,
moving from work to retirement also implies a number of changes in the
consumption habits of an individual, which may also aﬀect his or her ex-
posure to other forms of taxation, such as VAT. While we do take this eﬀect
into account in our estimations, a word of caution should be added. Most
of the VAT impact is due not so much to changes in the composition of con-
sumption baskets (VAT rates are fairly homogenous) but to the lower in-
come level of pensioners. One is therefore led to assume, as we do here, that
a relatively stable relationship exists between income and sales/consump-
tion taxes. While this may be a correct ﬁrst-order approximation, it should
be interpreted with care, as it may easily overestimate the reduction in in-
direct taxation that follows retirement. The reason is obvious: VAT is a
consumption tax, hence the portion of disposable income that is saved is
not burdened with VAT. Saving propensities drop substantially after re-
tirement, which may imply that the amount of VAT paid, as a percentage
of one’s income or income taxes, does not stay constant but increases after
retirement.
These caveats notwithstanding, we proceeded as follows. For each indi-
vidual in the 1940 cohort, and for each age from 55 onward, we computed
the total income taxes paid; that is, the sum of the income taxes paid as an
active worker (assuming that our estimated labor income at that age, and
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(again, assuming the pension received coincided with her or his total in-
come). Additionally, we have tried to impute the VAT taxes paid, starting
from the income taxes and multiplying by a VAT factor deﬁned as:
VAT   PT/T,
where PT consists of VAT plus other sales and consumption taxes, and T
is total income taxes. The resulting VAT factor, using national accounts
data for 1995–2001 is 0.92.3
The total tax receipts from a pension system, ignoring the general equi-
librium eﬀects, are therefore given by:
Total Taxes   SS contribution   (1   VAT) Income Taxes.
The diﬀerence between total taxes under the base case and under each of
the ﬁve reforms quantiﬁes the ﬁscal impact of that reform.
9.5 Results
Overall, the results are mixed, and in a sense, as we should make clear as
we proceed with the discussion, not fully satisfactory. Recall our distinc-
tion (see introduction) between a mechanical and a behavioral eﬀect of a
policy reform. As we argued there, to the extent that individuals who are in
the middle, or toward the end, of their working history are faced with a
change of rules to which they cannot appropriately respond, the ﬁrst eﬀect
is always present. The second will come about only if two conditions are si-
multaneously realized: (1) the reform aﬀects the ﬁnancial incentives to ei-
ther retire or continue working, and (2) people respond strongly to varia-
tions in such ﬁnancial incentives.
Basically, as one would have expected from the low ability of our re-
duced-form estimations to capture the variability of retirement behaviors,
while the ﬁve reforms do aﬀect the two incentive indicators, the latter do
not induce strong behavioral responses on the part of workers. More pre-
cisely, the fraction of workers whom, we estimate, would postpone retire-
ment age is quite small, and the number of years by which retirement is
postponed is also small. As a consequence, the overall ﬁscal impact of the
various reforms is due mostly to the mechanical component, with little be-
ing added by the change in workers’ behavior. While this statement should
(and will [see the analysis of individual reforms, regime by regime, in the
rest of this section]) be qualiﬁed, we think it summarizes decently well the
overall picture. We are inclined to say that, if our estimations of the behav-
ior of Spanish workers past age 55 were to be taken at face value, then the
most eﬀective way of postponing retirement would be to simply legislate a
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3. See the Bank of Spain web site, at www.bde.es.shift in the early and normal retirement ages without bothering to modify
the other rules.
9.5.1 Results by Regime and Gender
Since the results are fairly homogeneous across sexes, we present de-
tailed results only for males. Results for females are available on request.
However, our comments cover both groups without distinguishing be-
tween them. Obviously, as female labor-force participation is still substan-
tially low in Spain, the actual magnitude involved is rather diﬀerent be-
tween men and women.
RGSS
We begin our analysis of results from the RGSS. Figure 9.1reports SSW
by age for the S3 model. We have collected the ﬁve reforms in three groups,
one for each panel; to allow for ease of comparison with the status quo, the
latter is reported in each panel. In the ﬁrst panel, we compare the status
quo with the R1 reform in its two versions, S2 and S3. As S3 diﬀers from
S2 only in the retirement hazard, SSW estimates are identical. They are
both lower than in the base case, especially at the crucial ages between 55
and 65. The reduction is substantial and, in particular, this reform also
shifts forward the SSW age proﬁle in such a way that the maximum is now
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Fig. 9.1 SSW by age of labor force exit: A, RGSS; B, Option Value; C, S3 model
A B




Fig. 9.3 Total eﬀect by age of retirement and regime: A, Three-Year Reform; B,
Option Value; C, S2 and S3 models
A B
Creached at a later age, around 65 to 67, instead of the current 63 to 65. A
similar but somewhat less strong reduction in SSW is obtained by the Com-
mon Reform, R3, while the impact of the Actuarial Reform, R2, is small.
Further, neither R2 nor R3 succeed at shifting forward the age at which
SSW is maximized, thereby leaving this incentive to retirement basically
unaltered. Things are even less satisfactory for the two Spanish reforms,
R97 and A02, reported in the third panel: the age proﬁle of SSW is left un-
changed by these reforms. This behavior of the SSW indicator is reﬂected
in that of (cumulated) taxes paid at each retirement age, which are reported
in ﬁgure 9.2. The aggregate behavior seems simple enough to be under-
standable without comment. The disaggregation of the ﬁscal impact of re-
forms is discussed in the following. In the two upper panels of ﬁgures 9.3,
9.4, and 9.5 we report, by age and for each reform, the estimated total
change in gross and net SSW. The reader should not be confused by the
diﬀerent scales used in the various panels. The top two panels of ﬁgure 9.3
show that the impact of R1 is much stronger on gross SSW under S3 than
S2, while the result is mixed, or even reversed, for net SSW. As shown in
ﬁgure 9.4, the impact of R2 is either irrelevant (as it reduces gross SSW
Fig. 9.4 Total eﬀect by age of retirement and regime: A, Actuarial and Common
Reforms; B, Option Value; C, S3 model
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A B
CFig. 9.5 Total eﬀect by age of retirement and regime: A, Spanish reforms; B, Op-
tion Value; C, S3 model
A B
C
Fig. 9.6 Fiscal implications of reforms as a percentage of the GDP by gender and
regime, S3 model
A B
Conly for people retiring very late, while at the same time increasing their net
SSW) or it goes in the wrong direction, slightly increasing SSW at earlier
retirement ages. Reform R3, instead, does reduce SSW substantially at the
normal retirement age and, by an almost negligible amount, at earlier dates
(ﬁgure 9.6, top panels). Finally, in the top panels of ﬁgure 9.5, the two
Spanish reforms seem to cause a negligible, and most of the time unde-
sired, eﬀect on SSW wealth at all retirement ages considered.
The impact of the ﬁve reforms on the distribution of retirement ages can
be found in ﬁgure 9.7, which is also structured in three panels to facilitate
comparison. Results are straightforward: R97 and A02 have no impact on
retirement ages; both the Actuarial and the Common Reform shift the dis-
tribution only very mildly to the right, making the peak at age 65 more pro-
nounced. The R1 reform has a much stronger impact, in the S3 version in
particular, on the distribution of retirement ages. This is not very surpris-
ing. The current peaks at 60 and 65 are moved to 63 and 68, respectively,
while the rest remain roughly the same.
Let us now closely consider the ﬁscal impact of the various reforms. This
can be done by studying tables 9.5 and 9.6. A large amount of information
is reported in these tables, hence we outline only the main features. In table
9.5 we have reported, for each reform, a breakdown of the diﬀerent com-
ponents of the total ﬁscal impact: reduction in beneﬁts, increase in payroll
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Fig. 9.7 Distribution of age of labor force exit: A, RGSS; B, Option Value; C, S3
model
C
A BTable 9.5 Fiscal impact of reforms by regime: Males in RGSS (in 106 2001 euros)
Present discounted value
Change relative to base
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Comparative reforms
Peak value: S1
Beneﬁts 11,700 9,989 12,147 7,987 –14.6 3.8 –31.7
Taxes
Payroll 5,526 5,796 5,702 6,291 4.9 3.2 13.8
Income 2,257 1,903 2,389 1,548 –15.6 5.9 –31.4
VAT 1,757 1,540 1,804 1,279 –12.4 2.7 –27.2
Total 9,540 9,239 9,896 9,118 –3.2 3.7 –4.4
Peak value: S2
Beneﬁts 12,000 10,061 12,280 8,032 –16.2 2.3 –33.1
Taxes
Payroll 5,558 5,730 5,698 5,989 3.1 2.5 7.8
Income 2,341 1,902 2,426 1,529 –18.8 3.7 –34.7
VAT 1,791 1,553 1,830 1,293 –13.3 1.6 –27.8
Total 9,689 9,185 9,944 8,811 –5.2 2.6 –9.1
Peak value: S3
Beneﬁts 12,000 9,730 12,280 8,032 –18.9 2.3 –33.1
Taxes
Payroll 5,558 6,491 5,698 5,989 16.8 2.5 7.8
Income 2,341 1,968 2,426 1,529 –15.9 3.7 –34.7
VAT 1,791 1,478 1,820 1,293 –17.4 1.6 –27.8
Total 9,689 9,937 9,944 8,811 2.6 2.6 –9.1
Option value: S1
Beneﬁts 11,507 9,995 12,432 8,023 –13.1 8.0 –30.3
Taxes
Payroll 5,654 5,793 5,349 6,008 2.5 –5.4 6.3
Income 2,233 1,903 2,410 1,517 –14.8 7.9 –32.0
VAT 1,728 1,541 1,850 1,295 –10.8 7.0 –25.1
Total 9,615 9,237 9,609 8,820 –3.9 –0.1 –8.3
Option value: S2
Beneﬁts 11,829 10,119 12,572 8,009 –14.5 6.3 –32.3
Taxes
Payroll 5,654 5,658 5,303 5,516 0.1 –6.2 –2.4
Income 2,316 1,904 2,441 1,466 –17.8 5.4 –36.7
VAT 1,766 1,563 1,867 1,305 –11.5 5.8 –26.1
Total 9,735 9,125 9,611 8,287 –6.3 –1.3 –14.9
Option value: S3
Beneﬁts 11,829 9,676 12,572 8,009 –18.2 6.3 –32.3
Taxes
Payroll 5,654 6,494 5,303 5,516 14.9 –6.2 –2.4
Income 2,316 1,955 2,441 1,466 –15.6 5.4 –36.7
VAT 1,766 1,472 1,867 1,305 –16.6 5.8 –26.1
Total 9,375 9,920 9,611 8,287 1.9 –1.3 –14.9taxes, variation in income, and VAT taxes. The breakdown is calculated for
three models (S1 to S3) and using two diﬀerent ﬁnancial measures of re-
tirement incentives, the peak and option values. Table 9.6 summarizes the
decomposition of the ﬁscal eﬀects into the behavioral and the mechanical
components, which were discussed earlier in the chapter. The main ﬁndings
are strikingly simple. First, neither of the two Spanish reforms make any
diﬀerence4—variations are of the same magnitude of rounding errors, and
are completely accounted for by the sample uncertainty of our estimations.
Among the other three reforms, the Common Reform is the one with the
largest negative impact on both beneﬁts paid to retirees and on tax rev-
enues; the total eﬀect on government revenues is positive because the drop
in beneﬁts is about three times larger than the drop in tax revenues (table
9.6). While the quantities estimated diﬀer, both the option and the peak
value indicators provide the same ranking of eﬀects, and the estimated
changes in government revenues and outlays are comparable. Next, in terms
of total impact, comes the R1 reform under the S3 simulation procedure,
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4. See Jiménez-Martín (1999) or Abío et al. (1999) for previous evaluations. In both cases
the estimated eﬀects are of small magnitude.
Table 9.5 (continued)
Present discounted value
Change relative to base
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Spanish-speciﬁc reforms
Base (A) R97 (B) A02 (C) (B)/(A) (C)/(A)
Peak value: S3
Beneﬁts 12,000 11,922 12,392 –0.6 3.3
Taxes
Payroll 5,5558 5,512 5,601 –0.8 0.8
Income 2,341 2,302 2,454 –1.7 4.8
VAT 1,791 1,783 1,832 –0.4 2.3
Total 9,689 9,597 9,886 –1.0 2.0
Option value: S3
Beneﬁts 11,829 11,829 12,427 0.0 5.0
Taxes
Payroll 5,654 5,629 5,584 –0.4 –1.2
Income 2,316 2,297 2,460 –0.8 6.2
VAT 1,766 1,768 1,837 0.2 4.0
Total 9,735 9,694 9,881 –0.4 1.5
Notes: The ﬁrst four columns show the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes under the base case, the three com-
parative reforms and two Spanish-speciﬁc reforms: the 1997 reform and the 2002 amendment. The last
three columns show the change relative to the base, for beneﬁts and for taxes. RGSS   Régimen Gen-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.that is, assuming that retirement ages are eﬀectively shifted three years
down, pretty much by ﬁat. This reform also yields an important improve-
ment of the government net position; most of it comes from a reduction in
the net present value of beneﬁts, with a small residual due to increase in to-
tal taxation. In particular, the substantial increase in payroll contributions
generated by the longer worklife is almost completely balanced by the re-
duction in income and VAT revenues that the reform induces. Next, in terms
of change in the ﬁscal position, is the R1 reform as estimated under the S2
hypothesis; directions of change are the same as in the S3 version but, obvi-
ously, the quantities are much smaller. Finally, R2 is predicted to have a neg-
ative impact on the ﬁscal position of government, as the small increase in
tax revenues it induces is more than compensated by an increase in beneﬁts
paid, leading to a small but visible worsening of the government net posi-
tion.
A second look at table 9.6 also shows that, as anticipated earlier, the be-
havioral impact of the reforms we consider is rather limited. Most of the
savings comes from the mechanical aspects of the change; that is, the fact
that by suddenly reducing beneﬁts or lengthening working lives one cap-
tures the workers oﬀ guard, especially the older workers, and this leads to
substantial savings for the public purse. For this reason, mechanical eﬀects
are orders of magnitude larger than the behavioral ones, uniformly across
reforms and independently of the ﬁnancial indicator adopted. Notice that,
at least in the case of R3 and R1  S3, the relative reduction of government
net outlays is substantial, oscillating between –18.0 and –30.0 percent, de-
pending on the ﬁnancial indicator adopted.
RESS
Move next to estimates for workers enrolled in the special regimes, of
which RETA is by far the most important, and upon which most of our data
rely. Results here are dirtier, especially when it comes to forecasting the im-
pact of each speciﬁc reform on retirement patterns by age. This is due, as
discussed earlier, to the very low explanatory power of our ﬁnancial mea-
sures of incentive to retirement, which in the case of the self-employed cap-
ture a small portion of the actual retirement patterns. In any case, the anal-
ysis proceeds in the same fashion as for the RGSS and results are organized
likewise. However, we omit the corresponding SSW and tax ﬁgures.
The two lower panels of ﬁgures 9.3 to 9.5 contain the relevant infor-
mation. In ﬁgure 9.3 we see that, similarly to RGSS, the impact of R1 on
gross SSW is substantially stronger under S3 than S2, and that, contrary to
RGSS, the same ranking of relative impact applies to net SSW. The impact
of R2 is either irrelevant (as it reduces SSW only for people retiring either
very early or very late) or it goes in the wrong direction, slightly increasing
SSW at currently observed retirement ages (between 60 and 69). Reform
R3, instead, does reduce SSW substantially and across the whole spectrum
of possible retirement ages, with a somewhat stronger impact at 60 and 65
388 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-Martin(ﬁgure 9.4, bottom panels). Finally, in the bottom panels of ﬁgure 9.5, the
two Spanish reforms appear to have a small impact, in the correct direc-
tion, on the SSW of self-employed people, in particular before and around
the normal retirement age of 65. It is important to notice, though, that the
amounts involved in this case are quite small, and that the likely impact on
retirement behavior is probably negligible.
The likely eﬀect of the ﬁve reforms on the distribution of retirement ages
can be found in ﬁgure 9.8. Results in this case seem to be slightly more pos-
itive than in the RGSS case, but only by small amounts. The two Spanish re-
forms, R97 and A02, appear to have some impact on retirement ages, which
are pushed slightly to the right; the Actuarial Reform instead does not shift
the distribution of retirement ages, while the Common Reform moves it vis-
ibly to the right, making the peak at age 65 even more pronounced than it
already is. The R1 reform has a strong impact, in particular in the S3 ver-
sion. Compared to the RGSS case of ﬁgure 9.7, the impact is weaker; still, it
is the most substantial among those produced by the ﬁve reform scenarios.
Finally, we can see the disaggregation of the ﬁscal eﬀects in tables 9.7 and
9.8. As before for the RGSS, in table 9.7 we have reported, for each reform,
a breakdown of the diﬀerent components of the total ﬁscal impact: reduc-
tion in beneﬁts, increase in payroll taxes, variation in income and VAT taxes.
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Fig. 9.8 Distribution of age of labor force exit: A, RETA; B, Option Value; C, S3
model
A B
CTable 9.7 Fiscal impact of reforms by regime: Males in RETA (in 106 2001 euros)
Present Discounted Value
Change relative to base
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Comparative reforms
Peak value: S1
Beneﬁts 2,191 1,786 2,311 985 –18.5 5.5 –55.1
Taxes
Payroll 773 865 775 852 11.9 0.3 10.3
Income 411 353 433 244 –14.0 5.6 –40.5
VAT 309 253 324 145 –17.9 4.9 –53.1
Total 1,492 1,471 1,532 1,241 –1.4 2.7 –16.8
Peak value: S2
Beneﬁts 2,340 1,868 2,403 987 –20.2 2.7 –57.8
Taxes
Payroll 591 629 603 687 6.3 1.9 16.2
Income 423 361 434 249 –14.5 2.8 –41.0
VAT 332 267 340 146 –19.5 2.4 –56.0
Total 1,346 1,257 1,377 1,082 –6.6 2.3 –19.6
Peak value: S3
Beneﬁts 2,237 1,808 2,350 987 –19.2 5.1 –55.9
Taxes
Payroll 719 812 717 789 12.9 –0.3 9.7
Income 413 354 433 246 –14.4 4.9 –40.5
VAT 316 257 331 146 –18.6 4.6 –53.9
Total 1,448 1,423 1,481 1,180 –1.7 2.2 –18.5
Option value: S1
Beneﬁts 2,318 1,805 2,342 984 –22.1 1.0 –57.5
Taxes
Payroll 660 875 684 856 32.5 3.5 29.5
Income 425 364 431 250 –14.5 1.4 –41.2
VAT 327 254 330 144 –22.3 0.8 –56.1
Total 1,413 1,493 1,445 1,250 5.7 2.2 –11.6
Option value: S2
Beneﬁts 2,318 1,849 2,342 984 –20.2 1.0 –57.5
Taxes
Payroll 660 766 684 856 16.0 3.5 29.5
Income 425 363 431 250 –14.8 1.4 –41.2
VAT 327 263 330 144 –19.8 0.8 –56.1
Total 1,413 1,391 1,445 1,250 –1.6 2.2 –11.6
Option value: S3
Beneﬁts 2,318 1,805 2,342 984 –22.1 1.0 –57.5
Taxes
Payroll 660 875 684 856 32.5 3.5 29.5
Income 425 364 431 250 –14.5 1.4 –41.2
VAT 327 254 330 144 –22.3 0.8 –56.1
Total 1,413 1,493 1,445 1,250 5.7 2.2 –11.6Again, the breakdown is calculated for three models (S1 to S3), and using
two diﬀerent ﬁnancial measures of retirement incentives, the peak and op-
tion values. Similarly, in table 9.8 we report the decomposition between me-
chanical and behavioral components. There are quantitative, but not qual-
itative, diﬀerences with the RGSS case described earlier (tables 9.5 and 9.6).
The two Spanish reforms now have a somewhat more visible impact on the
ﬁscal position, which is predicted to improve slightly (see table 9.8). The
magnitudes involved, though, are quite small (less than 5 percentage points)
and may still be accounted for by the sample uncertainty of our estimates.
Among the other three reforms, the Common Reform is the one with the
largest negative impact on both beneﬁts paid to retirees and tax revenues;
the total eﬀect on government revenues is substantially positive. In fact, the
percentage variations involved are much larger (about twice the size) than
those we estimated for the RGSS (see table 9.8). Next, in terms of total ﬁs-
cal impact, comes the R1 reform under the S3 simulation procedure. This
reform also yields an important improvement of the government net posi-
tion; slightly more than half of it comes from a reduction in the net present
value of beneﬁts, with the rest coming from an increase in taxation, in par-
ticular a substantial increase in payroll contributions due to the longer
worklife. Next is R1 under the S2 hypothesis; directions of change are the
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Table 9.7 (continued)
Present Discounted Value
Change relative to base
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Spanish-speciﬁc reforms
Base (A) R97 (B) A02 (C) (B)/(A) (C)/(A)
Peak value
Beneﬁts 2,340 2,272 2,243 –2.9 –4.1
Taxes
Payroll 591 594 632 0.4 6.8
Income 423 411 414 –2.8 –2.0
VAT 332 323 318 –2.7 –4.3
Total 1,346 1,328 1,364 –1.3 1.3
Option value
Beneﬁts 2,318 2,245 2,205 –3.1 –4.9
Taxes
Payroll 660 672 699 1.8 5.8
Income 425 413 413 –2.9 –3.0
VAT 327 318 311 –2.9 –4.9
Total 1,413 1,403 1,423 –0.7 0.7


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Fig. 9.9 Fiscal implications of comparative reforms as a percentage of the GDP,
RGSS and RETA: A, Three-Year Reform; B, Actuarial Reform; C, Common Re-
form
A
Bsame as in the S3 version but, obviously, the quantitative impact is much
smaller, as people are not forced to shift ahead three years of that part of
their retirement behavior that is captured by age dummies. Finally, R2 is
predicted to have a negative impact on the ﬁscal position of government, as
the small increases in tax revenues it induces is more than compensated by
an increase in beneﬁts paid, leading to a small but visible worsening of the
government net position.
9.5.2 1940 Cohort Results for RGSS and RETA
A second look at table 9.6 also shows that, as anticipated earlier, the be-
havioral impact of the reform scenarios we consider is rather limited. Most
of the savings come from the mechanical aspect of the changes: reforms
that unexpectedly reduce beneﬁts (such as the Common Reform) do have
a positive impact on the government ﬁscal position, while reforms that
legally force workers to retire later, like the R1, especially in the R3 simu-
lation, have a strong impact on retirement patterns and, consequently, ben-
eﬁts paid out. For this reason, mechanical eﬀects are orders of magnitude
larger than the behavioral ones, uniformly across reforms and independent
of the ﬁnancial indicator adopted. Notice that, at least in the case of R3
and R1   S3, the relative reduction of government net outlays is substan-
tial, oscillating between –18.0 and –30.0 percent, depending on the ﬁnan-
cial indicator adopted. These conclusions are summarized in ﬁgures 9.9 to
Fig. 9.9 (continued)
Spanish Pension Expenditure under Alternative Reform Scenarios 395
C9.11. Figure 9.9 reports the ﬁscal eﬀect of each reform by gender and
regime, using simulation S3; ﬁgure 9.10 reports the total (RGSS plus
RETA) ﬁscal eﬀect of each reform for both simulations S1 and S3. We dis-
tinguish, in each case, between mechanical and behavioral eﬀect. The same
information is reported, in numerical form, in tables 9.9 and 9.10. All the
quantities reported in these tables and ﬁgures, we recall, are relative to the
1940 cohort; that is to say, we compute the positive/negative variations in
pension expenditure and tax revenues that are induced by applying each of
the ﬁve reforms to the 1940s cohort only. At the same time, it should also
be noted that the numbers we report are net present value estimations, that
is, they correspond to the net present value, at the time of reform, of the
variations induced by the reform itself over the remaining life of the cohort.
They do not correspond, therefore, to variations in annual ﬂows.
Our model predicts that the two Spanish reforms, R97 and A02, have a
negligible total ﬁscal eﬀect, that the Actuarial Reform (R2) would worsen
the ﬁscal position of the government, and that, ﬁnally, the R1 and the
Common Reform (R3) would improve it. The largest eﬀect is predicted for
the R1 reform under the S3 simulation scenarios, that is, when that portion
of current retirement patterns that is captured by age dummies is shifted to
the right of exactly three years. The net amount saved, in this case, is sub-
stantial: about 0.80 percentage points of GDP. In the other two cases (R1
without the impact of age dummies, and R3), the amounts saved are, re-
spectively, around 0.35 and 0.55 percentage points of GDP. While these are
large amounts, they are not so large in relation to either the annual expen-
diture for social security pensions (which is about 10 percentage points of
GDP) or to the size of outstanding Spanish pension debt, which is esti-
mated to range around 200 percentage points of GDP. Even by multiply-
ing these quantities by a factor of ﬁfty (that is, even assuming that savings
of similar size can be achieved during the next ﬁfty years for each cohort
born between 1940 and 1990) we would still be projecting total savings
equal to, at best, 20 percent of the outstanding pension debt. From this
perspective, the savings that can be achieved via the reforms considered
here are somewhat modest and, probably, still below the level that appears
to be desirable. Finally, we should note that, in all cases but R2   S3, most
of the savings come from the mechanical aspect. Only R2   S3 shows a
large behavioral eﬀect, which is due to the fact that, by shifting the age
dummies to the right, we are in fact assuming that Spanish workers will vol-
untarily choose to translate their age-related retirement patterns forward
three years. One should keep in mind that, once a reform is implemented,
workers will adjust their behavior optimally (from their viewpoint) to the
changed circumstances. After a few years, such adjustment is likely to elim-
inate or at least greatly reduce the savings that we estimate to accrue via the
mechanical channel. This would leave, in the long run, only the impact of
396 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-MartinFig. 9.10 Fiscal implications of Spanish reforms as a percentage of the GDP,
RGSS and RETA: A, Spanish R97 reform; B, Spanish A02 reform
A
BTable 9.9 Total ﬁscal impact of reforms (in 106 2001 euros)
Present discounted value
Change relative to base
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Comparative reforms
Peak value: S1
Beneﬁts 18,842 15,990 19,606 11,967 –15.1 4.1 –36.5
Taxes
Payroll 8,602 9,093 8,845 9,764 5.7 2.8 13.5
Income 3,588 3,035 3,797 2,381 –15.4 5.8 –33.6
VAT 2,809 2,441 2,894 1,910 –13.1 3.0 –32.0
Total 15,000 14,570 15,536 14,055 –2.9 3.6 –6.3
Peak value: S2
Beneﬁts 19,441 16,195 19,900 12,027 –16.7 2.4 –38.1
Taxes
Payroll 8,410 8,695 8,616 9,135 3.4 2.5 8.6
Income 3,716 3,044 3,846 2,363 –18.1 3.5 –36.4
VAT 2,885 2,478 2,935 1,929 –14.1 1.7 –33.1
Total 15,011 14,217 15,397 13,428 –5.3 2.6 –10.5
Peak value: S3
Beneﬁts 19,441 15,704 19,900 12,027 –19.2 2.4 –38.1
Taxes
Payroll 8,410 9,915 8,616 9,135 17.9 2.5 8.6
Income 3,716 3,138 3,846 2,363 –15.5 3.5 –36.4
VAT 2,885 2,368 2,935 1,929 –17.9 1.7 –33.1
Total 15,011 15,421 15,397 13,428 2.7 2.6 –10.5
Option value: S1
Beneﬁts 18,647 16,026 20,045 12,016 –14.1 7.5 –35.6
Taxes
Payroll 8,707 9,018 8,283 9,292 3.6 –4.9 6.7
Income 3,560 3,035 3,825 2,343 –14.8 7.4 –34.2
VAT 2,780 2,448 2,964 1,932 –11.9 6.6 –30.5
Total 15,047 14,501 15,072 13,566 –3.6 0.2 –9.8
Option value: S2
Beneﬁts 19,221 16,301 20,247 11,997 –15.2 5.3 –37.6
Taxes
Payroll 8,485 8,633 8,040 8,653 1.7 –5.3 2.0
Income 3,687 3,062 3,860 2,292 –17.0 4.7 –37.8
VAT 2,851 2,491 2,991 1,942 –12.6 4.9 –31.9
Total 15,023 14,186 14,891 12,887 –5.6 –0.9 –14.2
Option value: S3
Beneﬁts 19,221 15,655 20,247 11,997 –18.6 5.3 –37.6
Taxes
Payroll 8,485 9,889 8,040 8,653 16.5 –5.3 2.0
Income 3,687 3,128 3,860 2,292 –15.2 4.7 –37.8
VAT 2,851 2,360 2,991 1,942 –17.2 4.9 –31.9
Total 15,023 15,376 14,891 12,887 2.3 –0.9 –14.2the behavioral channel. And, as we have seen, the savings one can obtain
via the behavioral channel are estimated to be quite small for each and
every one of the reforms we have considered in this chapter. It is in this
sense that, as mentioned at the beginning, we ﬁnd the quantitative results
of our exercise unsatisfactory and, in some sense, worrying. To the extent
that one can predict, using advanced econometric techniques, even serious
and somewhat draconian reforms of the Spanish pension system, such as
those considered here, are not likely to reduce pension expenditure of any
signiﬁcant amount in the long run.
9.6 Distributional Issues
Distributional issues always loom big in discussions about pension re-
forms. They also happen to be among the least simple to handle. To the
extent that, given the historical circumstances, all reform proposals aim at
either reducing beneﬁts for future retirees or postponing the age of retire-
ment—or both—it is clear that some redistribution away from future re-
tirees is being planned. So much is clear, and the calculations reported in
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Table 9.9 (continued)
Present discounted value
Change relative to base
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Spanish-speciﬁc reforms
Base (A) R97 (B) A02 (C) (B)/(A) (C)/(A)
Peak value
Beneﬁts 19,441 19,234 19,822 –1.1 2.0
Taxes
Payroll 8,410 8,351 8,524 –0.7 1.4
Income 3,716 3,646 3,853 –1.9 3.7
VAT 2,885 2,862 2,920 –0.8 1.2
Total 15,011 14,859 15,296 –1.0 1.9
Option value
Beneﬁts 19,221 19,118 19,869 –0.5 3.4
Taxes
Payroll 8,485 8,467 8,426 –0.2 –0.7
Income 3,687 3,644 3,861 –1.2 4.7
VAT 2,851 2,841 2,925 –0.3 2.6
Total 15,023 14,951 15,212 –0.5 1.3
Notes: The ﬁrst four columns show the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes under the base case, the three com-
parative reforms and two Spanish-speciﬁc reforms: the 1997 reform and the 2002 amendment. The last


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 9.11 Distributional analysis: Comparative reforms, Option value, S1 (in 106 2001 euros)
Present discounted value
Three-Year Actuarial Common Change relative to base
Base Reform Reform Reform
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Quintile 1 (highest)
Beneﬁts 5,439 4,649 5,868 4,638 –790 429 –801
Taxes
Payroll 2,866 2,969 2,713 2,753 103 –153 –113
Income 1,287 1,119 1,374 1,089 –168 87 –197
VAT 805 706 861 716 –99 6.9 –89
Total 4,957 4,794 4,947 4,558 –163 –10 –400
Net change 627 439 –402
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –11.5 8.1 7.4
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 4,314 3,623 4,698 2,799 –691 384 –1,515
Taxes
Payroll 2,025 2,125 1,908 2,281 100 –117 256
Income 864 721 939 548 –143 74 –316
VAT 636 549 686 446 –87 7.9 –190
Total 3,525 3,394 3,533 3,275 –131 8 –250
Net change –560 376 –1,265
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –13 8.7 29.3
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 3,366 2,867 3,645 1,984 –499 279 –1,382
Taxes
Payroll 1,567 1,625 1,491 1,751 58 –77 184
Income 594 495 645 329 –99 51 –264
VAT 501 438 538 325 –63 7.4 –177
Total 2,663 2,558 2,674 2,405 –104 11 –257
Net change –395 268 –1,125
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –11.7 8 –33.4
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 2,993 2,594 3,202 1,591 –399 209 –1,402
Taxes
Payroll 1,303 1,339 1,256 1,408 35 –48 104
Income 467 393 504 228 –74 37 –239
VAT 451 400 479 268 –51 6.2 –183
Total 2,222 2,131 2,238 1,904 –90 16 –318
Net change –309 193 –1,085
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –10.3 6.4 36.2the previous section, especially at the very end, summarize the amount of
redistribution planned, in the aggregate, from the retiring cohort to the rest
of society. The natural question, at this point, is one of equal treatment
within the retiring cohort: which group of workers, within the 1940s co-
hort, is going to foot the bill? Is the cut going to be uniform across sexes,
educational levels, regime of aﬃliation, and so on?
It would be surprising if the kind of reforms we have been considering
aﬀect all workers in the same way and to the same extent. In fact, they do
not. In order to provide an initial assessment of such diﬀerential impact,
we have classiﬁed the individuals in our sample according to the quintile of
the Spanish labor income distribution to which they belong. We have then
used the simulated results from the various policy scenarios to estimate, in
the usual manner, the impact that each reform would have on the average
member of each quintile. We measure the impact on both beneﬁts and
taxes. The summary measure is the net impact of the reform in both ab-
solute and relative terms. A summary of our ﬁndings is reported in tables
9.11(S1 model)and 9.12(S3 model) for the comparative reforms, and table
9.13 for the Spanish speciﬁc reforms (S3 model only).
Consider ﬁrst R1-R3. The impression is striking. For all measures of ﬁ-
nancial incentives, the burden falls rather unevenly on diﬀerent income
groups. More importantly, diﬀerent reforms aﬀect diﬀerent groups quite
diﬀerently, so that some reforms are regressive (redistribute away from
the poorest quintiles more than from the richest quintiles) and others are
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Table 9.11 (continued)
Present discounted value
Three-Year Actuarial Common Change relative to base
Base Reform Reform Reform
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Quintile 5 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 2,508 2,266 2,603 990 –242 95 –1,518
Taxes
Payroll 940 955 911 1,093 15 –29 152
Income 344 303 359 145 –41 15 –199
VAT 383 351 396 175 –32 3.4 –208
Total 1,667 1,609 1,666 1,413 –58 –1 –254
Net change –184 96 –1,263
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –7.3 3.8 –50.4
Notes: For each quintile, the ﬁrst four columns show the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes under the base case,
the three comparative reforms, and two Spanish-speciﬁc reforms: the 1997 reform and the 2002 amend-
ment. The last three columns show the change relative to the base, for beneﬁts and for taxes.Table 9.12 Distributional analysis: Comparative reforms, Option value, S3 (in 106 2001 euros)
Present discounted value
Three-Year Actuarial Common  Change relative to base
Base Reform Reform Reform
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Quintile 1 (highest)
Beneﬁts 5,510 4,554 5,888 4,599 –955 378 –911
Taxes
Payroll 2,906 3,310 2,716 2,591 404 –190 –315
Income 1,320 1,146 1,390 1,063 –174 70 –257
VAT 810 681 861 713 –129 6.3 –97
Total 5,035 5,136 4,966 4,367 101 –69 –669
Net change –1,056 447 –242
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –19.2 8.1 –4.4
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 4,438 3,551 4,731 2,816 –887 293 –1,622
Taxes
Payroll 1,995 2,346 1,873 2,115 351 –122 120
Income 899 748 950 535 –151 51 –364
VAT 649 529 689 452 –120 6.1 –197
Total 3,544 3,623 3,513 3,102 79 –31 –441
Net change –996 324 –1,180
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –21.8 7.3 –26.6
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 3,501 2,813 3,688 1,990 –689 187 –1,512
Taxes
Payroll 1,504 1,758 1,436 1,622 254 –68 118
Income 619 514 649 320 –106 30 –299
VAT 519 424 545 328 –95 4.9 –191
Total 2,642 2,696 2,629 2,271 54 –13 –371
Net change –742 200 –1,141
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –21.2 5.7 –32.6
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 3,151 2,543 3,272 1,597 –608 121 –1,554
Taxes
Payroll 1,216 1,436 1,175 1,310 220 –41 94
Income 490 408 507 226 –82 17 –264
VAT 473 388 490 271 –85 3.6 –203
Total 2,179 2,231 2,172 1,807 52 –7 –372
Net change –667 128 –1,182
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –21.0 4.1 –37.5progressive (achieve the opposite). The following is a summary, reform by
reform.
R1: The reduction in the absolute amount of beneﬁts is monotone, in-
creasing from the lowest to the highest quintile, and almost monotone as
a percentage of current beneﬁts. The same is true for the net change,
which also takes into account the variations in contribution and taxes
the reform would bring about. The percentage reduction for people in
the highest quintile, though, is lower (about minus 10.0 percent) than for
the second and third higher. From the 12 percent reduction for the sec-
ond quintile the eﬀect decreases to minus 9 percent for the lowest. When
the S3 shift is added (the R1   S3 case), then the reduction in gross and
net beneﬁts more than doubles. In this case, the progressivity, which was
already very mild, disappears almost completely.
R2: The Actuarial Reform has a small but sizeable reverse eﬀect on the net
beneﬁts, as on average the latter increase. It is also fairly regressive, as
both the absolute value and the percentage by which beneﬁts increase is
actually decreasing with the level of earnings.
R3: As we pointed out, the Common Reform would imply a substantial cut
of beneﬁts in the case of Spain. While it changes retirement ages only
mildly, it cuts initial beneﬁts across the board, and of an amount equal
to roughly 30 percent of current pension payments. Together with the
forward shift in the early retirement age, which our model predicts as a
consequence of the reform, R3 has the eﬀect of drastically reducing
the SSW of the lowest-paid individuals. The amounts involved are very
large, and they appear most deﬁnitely unrealistic, at least from a socio-
political point of view: a cut in net beneﬁts of about 50 percentage points
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Table 9.12 (continued)
Present discounted value
Three-Year Actuarial Common  Change relative to base
Base Reform Reform Reform
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)/(A) (C)/(A) (D)/(A)
Quintile 5 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 2,602 2,167 2,647 984 –435 46 –1,618
Taxes
Payroll 862 1,034 838 1,011 172 –24 148
Income 356 309 361 145 –47 5 –211
VAT 397 333 403 175 –63 1.7 –221
Total 1,615 1,676 1,602 1,331 62 –13 –283
Net change –497 58 –1,334
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –19.1 2.2 –51.3
Notes: See table 9.11 notes.Table 9.13 Distributional analysis: Spanish reforms, S3 age dummies model 
(in 106 2001 euros)
Change relative  Present discounted value
to base
Base R97 A02
(A) (B) (C) (B)   (A) (C)   (A)
Quintile 1 (highest)
Beneﬁts 5,510 5,526 5,864 16 354
Taxes
Payroll 2,906 2,882 2,854 –24 –51
Income 1,320 1,313 1,416 –6 96
VAT 810 813 850 3 40
Total 5,035 5,009 1.7 –27 85
Net change 43 269
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 0.8 4.9
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 4,438 4,425 4,637 –13 199
Taxes
Payroll 1,995 1,991 1,977 –4 –18
Income 899 888 947 –11 47
VAT 649 649 673 –0 24
Total 3,544 3,528 1.5 –15 53
Net change 3 146
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 0.1 3.3
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 3,501 3,487 3,618 –14 117
Taxes
Payroll 1,504 1,504 1,498 –0 –5
Income 619 613 647 –6 28
VAT 519 518 533 –1 14
Total 2,642 2,634 1.4 –8 36
Net change –7 81
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –0.2 2.3
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 3,151 3,111 3,183 –40 32
Taxes
Payroll 1,216 1,220 1,219 4 3
Income 490 481 499 –9 9
VAT 473 468 477 –5 4
Total 2,179 2,169 0.7 –11 16
Net change –30 16
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –0.9 0.5does not seem to be in the cards of any political coalition. Also, in this
as in the previous case, the impact is regressive: higher-paid workers
would bear a smaller burden, at least in percentage. In fact, the degree
of regressivity that R3 displays is quite substantial.
The two Spanish reforms, as we already pointed out, have a practically
insigniﬁcant impact on aggregate quantities. The same is true for the ﬁve
quintiles.
R97: Besides doing little, which was already clear from the aggregate anal-
ysis, this is the only reform that aﬀects almost all groups equally. If any-
thing, it leans slightly more heavily on the lower wage groups, like all
other reforms except R1. In either case, the variations are estimated to
be of the order of plus or minus 1 percentage point of current beneﬁts.
A02: In this case, the aggregate impact is somewhat larger and the dis-
tributional one becomes pronouncedly regressive. The total diﬀerence
between the percentage gains of the highest-paid quintile (about 5 per-
centage points) and the losses of the lowest-paid one (minus 2 percent)
is quite large and, in some sense surprising, as the A02 modiﬁcation to
the R97 reform was arranged and agreed upon, in some sense requested
by, the Spanish trade unions.
9.7 Concluding Remarks
We summarize here the main ﬁndings, with an eye to policy implica-
tions and possible reforms. As pointed out in the main text, some of the
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Table 9.13 (continued)
Change relative  Present discounted value
to base
Base R97 A02
(A) (B) (C) (B)   (A) (C)   (A)
Quintile 5 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 2,602 2,551 2,546 –51 –56
Taxes
Payroll 862 867 874 5 12
Income 356 345 349 –11 –7
VAT 397 390 389 –6 –8
Total 1,615 1,603 –0.2 –12 –3
Net change –39 –53
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –1.5 –2.0
Notes:For each quintile the ﬁrst three columns show the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes under the
base case and the two Spanish-speciﬁc reforms: the 1997 reform and the 2002 amendment.
The last two columns show the change relative to the base.quantitative estimates reported should be taken with (more than) the usual
grain of salt, as they are based on estimations of reduced-form behavioral
equations that appear to have only a limited power to capture observed re-
tirement patterns. This caveat is particularly important for the aﬃliates to
the RETA, for which none of the ﬁnancial measures of retirement incentive
seem to play a major role in aﬀecting decisions. Once this is understood, our
ﬁndings can be summarized, reform by reform, as follows.
The Actuarial Reform is probably the least eﬀective among the three
comparison reforms considered in the volume. This evaluation applies
both in terms of expenditure, retirement patterns, and redistributional
eﬀect. Furthermore, most of the ﬁscal gains are accrued via the mechani-
cal channel, which suggests that little would be gained in the long run by
implementing the Actuarial Reform in Spain.
The Three-Year Reform may have an impact that is likely to become
quite strong if, by changing legislation, one also aﬀects in the same direc-
tion the behavioral component of retirement, which seems to be captured
purely by age dummies. In other words, if legislating 68 as the common re-
tirement age leads most people who now retire at 65 to retire at 68, then
the gains in labor-force participation of the elderly, achievable via the R1
scenario, could be substantial. Correspondingly, the ﬁscal gains could be
sizable even if, as we argued earlier, once we compare the magnitude of
these ﬁscal gains to the outstanding implicit social security debt of Spain,
the actual reduction would be likely to be around 15 percentage points at
most. Further, some redistributional aspects of the R1 reform need to be
adjusted to make it politically acceptable. The direction in which it redis-
tributes wealth, from future retirees to the working population, is prob-
ably acceptable, but the distribution of that burden within the retiring
cohorts seems much less acceptable, as it falls disproportionately on the
lowest-earning groups. This is an aspect that deserves further examina-
tion.
The same goes for the Common Reform. The latter does not really shift
retirement patterns uniformly but, rather, cuts in about half the exit rate
at age 60 (which corresponds to early retirement in Spain), and which is
mostly used by the lower wage earners. At the same time, it reduces bene-
ﬁts, and therefore outstanding SSW, quite drastically. Also, this reform,
like the previous one, suﬀers from having a very regressive bias, which
makes it politically unfeasible. The ﬁscal gains accrued entail drastic re-
ductions in the SSW and in the yearly pension payments of workers be-
longing to the lower 60 percent of the wage distribution.
The two Spanish reforms are the least eﬀective of the group. In both
cases the total SSW varies very little, retirement patterns remain almost
identical (a very mild shift to the right is predicted for the RETA aﬃliates),
and the net ﬁscal eﬀect is tiny. Also, these reforms are regressive when one
looks at within-cohorts redistribution. The amount of regressivity is, nat-
urally, limited by the small reduction in aggregate SSW. Still, and quite par-
408 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-Martinadoxically, the 2002 Amendment seems to make the overall Spanish reform
more regressive than it was after the 1997 change. In any case, there is no
reason to believe that the very minor improvement in the government ﬁs-
cal position that A02 engenders will be suﬃcient to contain the forthcom-
ing Spanish pension deﬁcit.
Appendix
Data and Variables
In this section we deﬁne the variables that have been employed in the spec-
iﬁcation of the reduced-form probit. The data source is the HLSS, unless
stated otherwise.
Variables from HLSS
Experience, Education, and Occupation
• Period: length of the current period in the dataset.
• History: history in the dataset, that is, length of participation in the la-
bor market.
• Part-time: indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the individual
does not work full time.
• Fraction working: history divided by potential experience (time
elapsed since ﬁrst time observed in the dataset).
• Temporary illness: length of history spent in temporary illness.
• Sector: one-digit SIC industry classiﬁcation.
• Contributive group: ten groups, from college to unskilled blue collar
workers.
• Education: proxy for the level of education, constructed as follows: all
individuals in contributive group 1 (i.e., college), are assigned to the
college level of the educational variable. People belonging to con-
tributive groups 2, 3, and 4 are assigned to the high school (diploma)
category. People in all other contributive groups are assigned to a
generic class labelled less than high school.
• Years of contributions: number of years contributed.
• Eligibility indicator: a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the in-
dividual meets the contributive threshold (ﬁfteen years of contribu-
tions); zero otherwise.
Earnings and Pension Variables
• Covered earnings or pensionable earnings: monthly amount upon
which SS taxes are levied.
Spanish Pension Expenditure under Alternative Reform Scenarios 409• Monthly earnings: methods of computation (for workers in RGSS) as
described in section 9.3.2.
• Pension amount: see section 9.2 for a detailed description.
• Average life cycle earnings: constructed on the basis of a ﬁxed-eﬀect
model for each contributive group.
• Expected earnings: see section 9.3.2 for a description.
• Expected earnings peak indicator: discounted sum of the expected
earnings from the present to the year the peak is reached.
• Expected earnings OV indicator: discounted sum of the expected
earnings from the present to the year the option value is maximized.
• Minimum pension indicator: a dummy variable that takes value 1 if
the individual’s expected retirement pension falls below the minimum
retirement pension.
• Censoring earnings indicators: two dummy variables. The ﬁrst takes
value 1 if the individual’s level of contributions falls below the mini-
mum (mandatory) level of contributions. The second takes value 1 if
the individual’s level of contribution is greater than the maximum level
of contributions.
Variables from the Collective Settlements Register (Estadística de
Convenios Colectivos [ECC])
Since we do not have direct information about regulations aﬀecting spe-
ciﬁc workers, we use the Spanish register of collective settlements in order
to construct proxies for such regulations. In particular, using the ECC (see
Jiménez-Martín [1998] for a brief description of the source) we have con-
structed three indicators of the coverage of early and mandatory retire-
ment provisions for each (two-digit) industry.
• Early-retirement indicator: fraction (weighted by employment) of col-
lective settlements, including a provision favoring early retirement.
• Retirement at 64: fraction (weighted by employment) of collective set-
tlements, including a provision to facilitate retirement of workers aged
64 without incurring age penalty. This variable only applies to people
aged 64 enrolled in RGSS.
• Mandatory retirement at 65: fraction (weighted by employment) of
collective settlements, including a provision promoting mandatory re-
tirement at 65. This variable only applies to people aged 65 enrolled in
RGSS.
The Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA)
EPA: a quarterly CPS-like survey of roughly 60,000 Spanish households. It
contains fairly detailed information on labor-force status, education, and
410 Michele Boldrin and Sergi Jiménez-Martinfamily background variables, but no information on wages and income.
Publicly released cross-sectional ﬁles are available from 1976 onward.
Starting with 1987, INE also releases the so-called Encuesta de Poblacion
Activa Enlazada(EPAL), which is the panel version of EPA obtained by ex-
ploiting the rotating cross-section nature of the original survey. It contains
fewer variables than EPA, but it permits the following of individuals for up
to six consecutive quarters.
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